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The rise of post-imperial populism: the case of right wing Euroscepticism 
in Britain 
 
Abstract 
  
Recent approaches to contemporary Euroscepticism have explained it in terms 
of the politics of opposition and peripherality that is characteristic of  
competitive party systems. Euroscepticism becomes a central strategy by which 
non-mainstream parties or factions within mainstream parties attempt to gain 
political advantage. In the British case, there has been a focus on the influence 
that Eurosceptic factionalism can have within a first-past-the-post 
parliamentary system.  This paper challenges explanations of British 
Euroscepticism in terms of the politics of opposition and the workings of the 
party system. Instead, it is proposed that a structural crisis of British party 
politics has allowed Euroscepticism to enter the political mainstream.  I 
conceive of Euroscepticism as a distinct and powerful national movement 
asserting conceptions of Britain's exceptional national identity.   This is viewed 
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as part of a post-imperial crisis that shifts parties, and factions within parties, 
towards populist forms of legitimation that have weakened possibilities for 
stable and coherent political leadership over European integration. 
Consequently, mainstream parties have struggled to protect themselves against 
the ideological influence of this populist Euroscepticism. This is particularly 
evident during periods of Eurosceptic mobilisation, and is demonstrated in this 
paper through the examination of the extensive role played by right wing 
Eurosceptic forces during the attempt by the Major government to ratify the 
Maastricht Treaty.   
 
Explaining Euroscepticism: factionalism and opposition? 
 
A considerable amount of research has emerged in recent years exploring 
party-based Euroscepticism in the EU member-states including new member-
states and accession countries (Taggart 1998; Marks and Wilson 2000; 
Szczerbiak and Taggart 2000; Sitter 2001; Szczerbiak and Taggart 2003; 
Batory and Sitter 2004; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004).  A key theme of this 
literature is that the organisation of party politics within national political 
systems determines the position of parties on European integration. Building 
on Taggart's (1998) seminal 'touchstone of dissent' thesis, a broad 
conceptualisation of Euroscepticism has been adopted that attempts to organise  
Euroscepticism within a hard-soft dichotomy (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2003). 
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Hard Euroscepticism can be defined as fundamental opposition to the idea of 
political and economic integration and expresses itself as 'a principled 
objection to the current form of integration in the European Union on the 
grounds that it offends deeply held values, or more likely, is the embodiment of 
negative values' (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2004). In contrast, soft 
Euroscepticism 'involves contingent or qualified opposition to European 
integration' and may express itself in terms of opposition to the specific 
policies or in terms of the defence of national interest (ibid: 4). As Szczerbiak 
and Taggart (2003) acknowledge, these represent working definitions that are 
not without problems
1
 but they provide an important basis for broad European 
comparisons of Eurosceptic parties and movements. Alongside these, case 
studies of individual countries are important in understanding the qualitative 
complexities of different national expressions of Euroscepticism.  
 
The high levels of Euroscepticism in a relatively large and influential EU 
member state has meant that British Euroscepticism has received considerable 
academic attention (Baker, Gamble and Ludlam 1993, 1994; Aspinwall 2000; 
Usherwood 2002; Baker, Gamble and Seawright 2002; Forster 2002). 
Eurocepticism is particularly associated with those British politicians on the 
right of the Conservative party who became increasingly opposed to the second 
wave of European integration during the 1980s and 1990s. There is, however, a 
longer history of Euroscepticism in Britain that can be traced back to the first 
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British application for membership to the European Community, if not before 
(Forster 2002).  During this history, British Eurosceptics have shared a 
common hostility towards the European Union, yet they have reflected a range 
of political opinion. This Euroscepticism is considered to have had a significant 
impact on British European policy and contributed to its position as the 
awkward partner within the integration process (George 1998). Specifically, it 
has contributed to the failure to embed a distinctive cross-party national 
approach to Europe that has been evident in other member states (Wallace 
1995: 50).  A key question surrounds the extent to which there is something 
distinctive and exceptional about British Euroscepticism. While we might 
argue that all political systems are in some respects exceptional, a central 
assumption of the comparative literature is that Euroscepticism can be broadly 
explained in terms of the organisation of competitive party systems that are 
characteristic of liberal democratic political orders within the European Union. 
Following on from this, a central finding is that Euroscepticism is the politics 
of opposition (see Szczebiak and Taggart 2000; Sitter 2001). Szczebiak and 
Taggart identify two key features of opposition Euroscepticism: 
 
The first is that opposition to the EU brings together 'strange 
bedfellows' of some very different ideologies. Opposition extends from 
new politics, old far left politics through regionalism to new populism 
and neo-fascism in the far right. The second point is that opposition to 
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the EU seems to be related to the positions of parties in their party 
systems. It differentiates between parties at the core and those at the 
periphery in the sense that wholly Euroscepetical parties are at the 
peripheries of their party systems while parties at the core are generally 
not Eurosceptical. (2000: 5) 
 
In the British case, recent studies have focused on the factional nature of 
Euroscepticism within political parties and this has been accounted for in terms 
of the distinctiveness of British political institutions in structuring opposition 
(Aspinwall 2000; Usherwood 2002). In those countries characterised by 
powersharing governments, a range of institutional mechanisms enables the 
'Euro-sceptic social voice' to be 'filtered out' (Aspinwall 2000: 433). In 
comparison, British governments operating in a system of one party rule have 
to give greater consideration to backbench Eurosceptic opinion than PR 
systems that tend to produce broad centrist governments. Governments in this 
situation have been shown to adopt negative positions towards European 
integration as a consequence of strong opposition within party ranks, 
particularly when faced with small majorities (ibid: 434-436). A further feature 
of these institutional dynamics has been the externalisation of Eurosceptic 
opposition (Usherwood 2002). The fudging of European policy, the failure to 
manage powerful Eurosceptic factions and a lack of salience across public 
opinion results in a radical extra-parliamentary Eurosceptic mobilisation that 
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has major implications for party cohesion.  From this perspective, the 
significance of Euroscepticism is to be found in a specific set of British 
institutional dynamics that has allowed Eurosceptic factionalism within the 
main parties to take on a particular significance. These arguments are 
consistent with analyses of Euroscepticism as the politics of opposition but 
they also point to the role a distinctive political system can play in determining 
the relationship of Euroscpetic politics to the mainstream.  
 
Both Aspinwall and Usherwood eschew explanations in terms of ideological 
factors, however their analyses suggest a crisis of political leadership and party 
cohesion that clearly has a significant ideological dimension. If we address 
issues of ideology, and of political culture more broadly, then the focus on 
Euroscepticism as the politics of factionalism and opposition becomes 
problematic. For example, Baker, Gamble and Seawright (2002) have shown 
that Euroscepticism in the Conservative party is fundamentally driven by a 
powerful hyperglobalist ideology at the very centre of the party. The key 
elements of this ideology include national economic and political independence 
within a global free market and it implies a fundamental opposition to 
European integration.  This position was advocated by leading members of the 
Conservative party from the early 1990s onwards and opened up critical 
divisions within the party from which it has yet to fully recover. In the British 
context, to focus on the politics of opposition and the party system detracts 
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from the extent to which Euroscepticism is intermeshed with the politics of the 
mainstream. This is clearly evident in Taggart's and Szczerbiak's (2002) most 
recent attempt to map pan-European Euroscepticism. It is notable that the 
British Conservative party is the only mainstream European party with the 
potential capacity to form a government that is placed under the so-called 'soft' 
Euroscepticism heading. The broader implication of this is that Britain is 
exceptional in the sense that Euroscepticism has entered into a cartel party i.e. 
a centre-left or centre-right party that attempts to appeal to broad spectrum of 
the electorate and alternate in government. Furthermore, we should not allow 
the focus on the Conservative party to obscure the history of Euroscepticism 
within Britain's Labour party both inside and outside of office. British 
Euroscepticism cannot be fully accounted for in terms of the workings of the 
party system and the politics of opposition and peripherality.  A central 
argument of this paper is that it is in fact a structural crisis within the party 
system, rather than the system per se, that has allowed Euroscepticism to take a 
hold in British politics. 
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The post-imperial restructuring of British politics 
 
Membership of the European Community (EC) became part of an elite driven 
strategy to transform and modernise a post-imperial British state from the 
1960s onwards (Kaiser 1996). However, the attempt to incorporate European 
integration into post-imperial projects of British renewal has proved to be 
highly contested. It is necessary to appreciate the extent to which ideological 
struggles over the meaning of 'Europe' for the British state have been part of a 
post-imperial hegemonic crisis of the British state (Nairn 1973). From the 
1970s onwards, the politics over British membership of the EC became 
increasingly dualised as the meaning of the British nation became more 
uncertain. Euroscepticism has articulated a profound and fundamental 
opposition between Britain and Europe. In particular, ideas of Britishness have 
been asserted that suggest that British political development is exceptional and 
antithetical to the continent.  A central proposition of this paper is that it is the 
populist manifestation of Euroscepticism in Britain that is significant in 
explaining its rise and influence.  
 
In an important contribution to understanding the legitimacy problems of 
European liberal democracies, Mair (2002) has argued that modern politics is 
increasingly characterised by a separation between constitutional and popular 
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democracy. Constitutional democracy refers to the institutional requirements 
for good governance while popular democracy refers to the will of the people. 
Mair accounts for the emerging separation between these two forms of rule in 
terms of the declining importance of a key mediating institution: the political 
party. The traditional populist role of the party was to mobilise electorates and 
achieve meaningful identification to a political ideology. This role has gone 
into decline and is indicated by political apathy and disillusionment with party 
politics.  In addition, as representative organs for patterns of interest within 
society, political parties have found their position usurped by a range of 
agencies and organisations outside of the party system. Nevertheless, political 
parties remain essential to the procedures of government. They continue to 
form governments, control key public appointments and enact legislation. This 
procedural and institutional role of parties has been maintained while their 
function in securing wider popular support has become problematic. For Mair, 
an overt populist politics has emerged as a solution to the legitimation deficit 
of modern political parties. In broad terms, in a populist democracy parties are 
no longer partisan but claim legitimacy on the basis that they represent the 
mass of the people. Populist democracies are not therefore party systems in a 
traditional sense because parties transform themselves into or are transcended 
by mass movements for national appeal.  
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We can specify an ideal type of populism as discourse and process (Canovan 
1999: 3-7; Meny and Surel 2002: 12-13). It is characterised by a direct appeal 
to the people for legitimacy that emerges out of the pathologies of traditional 
representative democracy. Canovan comments that populism turns politics into 
'a campaign to save the country or to bring about a great renewal' (ibid).  It 
may, therefore, have a characteristic mood that sets it apart from everyday, 
routine politics.  In particular, it appeals to a united people or nation against the 
existing power structures, which are accused of dividing it. It also involves a 
specific style of politics that involves simple and direct language, analyses and 
solutions to problems. It dichotomises complex political debates, not only into 
right and wrong and good and bad, but also into the nation and the 'other'.  
These movements can be seen as anti-political and fundamentalist in their 
pursuit of rigid and exclusive political identities. A final feature is the strength 
of populism as a political force in contemporary liberal democracies. Populist 
movements structure the political debate forcing 'more habitual participants 
into a defensive posture and into changing the way discussion takes place, 
issues are framed, and constituencies mobilised' (Taggart 2002: 78). Political 
movements articulating powerful symbolic and cultural causes are central to 
the shift to populism. 
 
The extent to which populism characterises the political system in Europe and 
can be identified as a significant political trend remains an empirical question. 
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However, Mair clearly makes a strong case for viewing Britain as a populist 
democracy in which the recent politics of New Labour represents a significant 
attempt to transcend the Westminster system. In fact the disillusionment in 
Britain with the two party system was already evident by the early 1970s.  
Nairn argues that since the 1970s 'each party has from the seventies onwards 
sought to become the state and the nation' (2001: 9 emphasis mine). This 
emerges out of the post-imperial crisis within the British political party system. 
This crisis was characterised by the declining legitimacy of an established elite, 
de-alignment and electoral volatility and the intensification of factionalism 
within the main political parties. These trends were exacerbated, if not caused 
by, the failure of governments of both political persuasions to halt British 
economic decline and realise projects of modernisation. Significant problems 
of governing a post-imperial Britain such as civil war in Northern Ireland and 
trade union militancy proved intractable. By the 1970s, there was a growing 
sense of a crisis of hegemony within the British state (Hall 1983; Leys 1983). 
In a context in which the traditional party system no longer seemed to provide 
effective government, one solution was to try and build a popular national 
consensus that could overcome the impasse in the party system. Both 
Thatcherism and New Labour were constituted as popular movements in 
opposition to the political parties that they claimed to represent. These 
powerful movements have aimed to transcend and marginalise the parties from 
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which they sprang. As Nairn describes it, 'salvaging greatness now came to 
demand a 'regime', a Revolution, or a 'Project'. (2001: 9) 
 
A dilemma for these movements is that Britain remains primarily a multi-
national post-imperial order that lacks any deep or unifying conceptions of 
ethnic or civic nationhood on which to be draw (McCrone and Kiely 2000).  
Britishness was primarily an imperial identity inaugurated with the Treaty of 
Union with Scotland in 1707.  In a context of imperial decline, the nation has 
had to be persistently regenerated and there has been a need for an 'other' 
against which a 'new' Britain can be redefined.  Since the 1970s 'Europe' and, 
more specifically the project of European integration, has played such a role.  
 
In the issue of British membership of the European Community, politicians on 
the left and right found a cause that could allow them to appeal directly to the 
nation and transcend party politics. It offered a unique opportunity to establish 
bases of popular legitimation for national projects that could not be 
accommodated within the main political parties. The best examples of this 
were Enoch Powell and Tony Benn. For Powell, anti-Europeanism was a way 
to assert a political project centred around a revival of English nationhood. For 
Benn, it was used to legitimate a project of an independent socialist Britain. 
Thus, Euroscepticism was a way to appeal to the people outside of the 
mechanisms and institutions of the party system. ‘Europe' was constituted 
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within the British debate as an issue that was fundamental to the nation; it was 
simply too important to be constrained by party loyalty. While Powell and 
Benn reflected different sides of the political spectrum, they fought together in 
the No campaign during the referendum on British membership of the 
European Community in 1975. Both saw in the issue of British membership an 
opportunity to reconnect with the people and establish movements that could 
transcend the crisis politics of the party system. This placed Europe at the 
centre of the crisis of both main political parties. A loose Eurosceptic 
movement emerged that fundamentally contested British accommodation with 
the integration process. Consequently, powerful sections of the main political 
parties mobilised against those pragmatic party elites who maintained the 
centrality of British membership of the EC to post-imperial economic and geo-
political survival.   
 
Euroscepticism emerged as the guardian of powerful national myths and drew 
on assumptions about British political identity that appeared to further the 
process of post-imperial decline. From such a perspective, Euroscepticism 
appears as part of a degenerating approach to international affairs found in the 
British political culture characterised by 'the centrality of the Westminster 
parliament' and 'the myth of exceptionalism – a free country confronting an 
unfree European continent'  (Wallace 1991: 29).  
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For Wallace the only genuine solution is for a new sense of national identity to 
be crafted from the realities of an interdependent world. The problem, 
however, is that the ‘outmoded' sense of nationhood he refers to has proved to 
be particularly resilient. Indeed, Euroscepticism can be seen as a distinct 
movement to defend core principles of Britishness and the British state that 
have proved resistant to transformation. In particular, right wing 
Euroscepticism has draw on ideological strands within Conservatism defined 
by its opposition to political interdependence in the global economy and 
interventionist government at the domestic level (see Baker, Gamble and 
Ludlam 1993).  This implies a return to laissez-faire in the world economy and 
minimal yet strong government on the domestic front. It is the cultural 
reworking of this ideological strand within Conservative politics that is central 
to understanding the importance of a right wing Euroscepticism that became so 
influential from the late 1980s onwards. Right wing Euroscepticism 
represented something regressive and conservative within the British political 
culture but its strength lies in its capacity to be populist and appear 
contemporary and radical.  By such means, it has been able to subvert the 
meaning of European integration within the British context by a revived 
discourse of British exceptionalism. 
 
A post-imperial crisis in British politics has embedded a structural 
susceptibility to populist politics. The populist manifestation of Euroscepticism 
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has been a significant expression of this crisis. Membership of the European 
Community could not be debated without evoking the nation and the people. 
‘Europe' was re-imagined by Eurosceptic forces as the ‘other' of British 
political identity and interests. It was symbolically constituted as a threat to 
Britain's exceptional social and political development. By turning Europe into a 
fundamental political issue, what we find is that it was no longer contained by 
the party system and the capacity to establish the kind of political consensus on 
the issue that was evident in other member-states proved impossible. Instead, 
Euroscepticism intermeshes with mainstream politics furthering the crisis of 
the British party system and the capacity of governing elites to achieve an 
effective and stable European policy.  This is explored in more detail in the 
next section by examining the right wing Eurosceptic rebellion against the 
Major government during the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993.  
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Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and Eurosceptic Mobilisation 
 
The manifestation of British Euroscepticism as populism and the implications 
of this are explored through a case study of the mobilisation in the 
Conservative party during the Maastricht crisis of the Major government. The 
process of Maastricht ratification represented a particular focus for debate 
about and opposition to the EU (Taggart 1998: 366). It ‘brought into sharp 
relief conceptions and evaluations of the European project that might otherwise 
have remained unexamined' (ibid).  Here, the purpose is to illustrate the 
distinctive features of a populist Eurosceptic mobilisation and the profound 
impact it can have on mainstream British politics. There are four features of 
this mobilisation that standout.  Firstly, it was a profound attack on the 
governing elite that could not be contained by traditional forms of party 
discipline. Secondly, the strength of this attack stemmed from the 
establishment of Euroscepticism as a national movement with mass appeal. 
This movement was not on the periphery of British politics but was supported 
by prominent politicians, including cabinet members and ex-cabinet members, 
and powerful individuals in British public life. Thirdly, the discourse of this 
movement was characterised by an appeal to the people based upon the cultural 
and symbolic construction of British exceptionalism. Finally, this mobilisation 
had a significant and negative impact on the governing elite's European policy. 
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It helped to secure a dominant Thatcherite approach to the European Union that 
has involved a re-assertion of British national exceptionalism.   
  
Undermining the government 
 
When John Major replaced Thatcher as a Prime Minister in 1990, he set out to 
craft a new constructive relationship with European partners. Europe was, 
therefore, an opportunity to distinguish the Major leadership from that of 
Margaret Thatcher.  In particular, Major was a keen supporter of British 
membership of the European exchange rate mechanism and this became a 
central plank of his economic policy. With important concessions negotiated at 
Maastricht over monetary union and the Social Chapter, the Conservative party 
united sufficiently to win the 1992 general election and the basis for a 
constructive European strategy appeared to be in place. In the ratification 
debate, Major defended a British conception of the Community arguing that 
'we can develop as a centralist institution, as some might want, or we can 
develop as a free-market, free trade, wider European Community more 
responsive to its citizens' (Hansard 213/ 284, 4 November 1992 emphasis 
mine). Despite setting out what was in many respects a free market Thatcherite 
strategy towards the Community, Major was still unable to stem the tide of 
rebellion.  The government's European policy began to unravel once Britain 
was forced out of the ERM and the full integrationist implications of the 
  
 
 
 
 
 
18 
Maastricht Treaty became manifest. Against this background, the Major 
government was exposed to an extensive populist mobilisation of a right wing 
Eurosceptic movement that directly challenged the legitimacy of the 
government. Here, I explore the initial rebellion inside the party.  
 
During the course of the Maastricht Treaty ratification a major rebellion 
emerged in the Conservative party that directly challenged the governing elite. 
It is possible to identify three objectives the strategy adopted by the Maastricht 
rebels in their bid to undermine the government (Baker et al 1994: 38). Firstly, 
they aimed to delay the bill hoping that it would be made invalid by external 
events such as another no-vote in a second Danish referendum. Eurosceptics 
were successful in getting a promise from the government that the third reading 
of the bill would be delayed until after the Danish referendum (Seldon 1998: 
342).   By the time this took place, there had been 210 hours of debate and over 
600 amendments (ibid).  Secondly, they campaigned for a referendum as they 
increasingly believed they had considerable public support. This came to a 
head on the 21
st
 April 1993 when the rebel Richard Shepherd called on the 
government to ‘trust the people' and that the bill had no mandate as the British 
people had been denied a choice on Maastricht during the election of 1992 
(Wintour, The Guardian April 22 1993). The rebels' referendum amendment 
was defeated by the government but only with the support of the opposition. 
The bill then went to the House of Lords where Thatcher led the attack calling 
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for a referendum and claiming she would never have signed the Treaty  
(Seldon 1998: 384). Thirdly, the rebels supported Treaty amendments that they 
considered fatal to the Treaty. The rebels joined with the Labour opposition in 
supporting the restoration of the Social Chapter believing that Major would not 
proceed with the bill if the opt-out was not included. Baker et al described the 
defeat of the government on this issue as the most damaging Commons defeat 
for a Tory government in the twentieth century (1994: 47). Those rebels who 
went back to supporting the government only did so after they extracted 
government statements stating would be no re-entry into the ERM or moves 
towards joining a single currency (ibid). The government was forced to call a 
confidence motion on its policy on the Social Chapter and only with the threat 
of a general election, which the Conservatives looked destined to lose, did the 
rebels support the government.  It was a pyrrhic victory for a government that 
had to resort to various deals and compromises with opposition parties, 
bullying of its own MPs and threats to use the Crown's prerogative.  
 
The Maastricht rebellion represented an extraordinary attack on the governing 
elite from within the ruling party. It was recognised by the government that the 
rebels were unwhippable and had become a separate organised faction within 
the party with their own offices, unofficial whips and ‘briefing books' (Seldon 
1998: 369). In effect, it represented such a profound attack on the governing 
elite that only the full exploitation of the power at the disposal of the British 
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executive secured ratification and only then did Major's threat of a general 
election bring the rebels back on board. In contrast, the rebels' victory was 
considerable as they had imposed long term constraints on the government's 
European strategy (ibid: 47).  
 
National mobilisation 
 
The real sociological dilemma for the Major government was not simply that it 
was faced with factionalism in the parliamentary party and cabinet but that by 
the July vote the Eurosceptics had in effect become a significant right wing 
national movement. They drew strength from the extensive extra-parliamentary 
support that was emerging for their cause. Increasingly, their refusal to accept 
the government whip suggested that their primary loyalty was to the anti-
European cause and not to the Conservative government under John Major. 
  
The extent of Euroscepticism as a national movement had been evident in the 
sustained attack on the government's attempts to ratify the Maastricht Treaty. 
They had become organised into a number of cross-cutting alliances and 
groupings both inside and outside parliament. Indeed, some twenty seven 
separate groups had been created in the 18 months following the December 
1991 Maastricht Council (Forster 2002: 88). In particular, the Fresh Start 
Group set up after the debate on the Danish referendum provided the 
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organisational dynamism for opposing the government's European policy and 
became the dominant parliamentary grouping. Its radical opposition to 
government legislation and its fundraising activities outside the party 
dramatically altered the rule of political conduct (ibid; Young 1998: 366). 
Alongside increased parliamentary organisation and support, Eurosceptics 
found that they could look to the press, the wider party and public opinion for 
support.  Significant sections of the press continued to provide substantial 
backing for the cause. The Sunday Telegraph and the Murdoch press all 
supported the call for a referendum (Baker et al 1994: 46). Support was also 
evident across all sections of the Conservative party. A survey of 4,000 
grassroots Conservative supporters by the Conservative political centre and 
made public during April 1993 indicated widespread disaffection with the 
Maastricht bill and significant support for a referendum (Bates, The Guardian 
19 April 1993). This trend was confirmed by surveys that showed a significant 
shift to the right on European issues amongst Conservative supporters between 
1991 and 1996 (Turner 2000: 175).  Furthermore there was significant financial 
support for the rebel's Maastricht referendum campaign (Marc) from traditional 
Tory business fund raising channels and overseas supporters (Baker et al 1994: 
46). In terms of public opinion, polls demonstrated that there was widespread 
support for a referendum alongside growing disillusionment with the process of 
European integration since the Maastricht summit of 1991 (ibid: 48; Marshall, 
The Independent 25 July 1993).  In this context, the Eurosceptic rebellion in 
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parliament has to be seen as part of a broader national movement opposing the 
second wave of European integration. The most vivid expression of this new 
movement was the founding of the European Foundation in October 1993, 
headed by Bill Cash. The European Foundation became an important vehicle 
for Eurosceptic arguments and for mobilising against the Major government.  It 
also introduced the significant figure of James Goldsmith into the European 
debate. Goldsmith went on to form the Referendum Party and fight the 1997 
general election and attracted 811, 827 votes, the best ever showing by a 
minority party (Carter et al 1998: 483).  What was evident, however, during 
and after the Maastricht rebellion was the extent to which this right wing 
movement began to re-configure and re-assert a Eurosceptical, Thatcherite 
project contra the Major government and the European Union.  
 
Appealing to the people: the discourse of right wing Euroscepticism 
 
The most influential alliances and arguments developed by Eurosceptics were 
on the Thatcherite right of the Conservative party many of whom were or had 
been at the centre of political power. These included significant Eurosceptics in 
the Major cabinet  (Lilley, Redwood, Portillo and Howard) and vocal ex-
ministers from the Thatcher and Major administrations (Tebbitt, Baker, 
Lamont). The most prominent backbench rebel during the Maastricht crisis, 
William Cash, was a Thatcherite as were the most prominent of the 1992 intake 
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of MPs such as Ian Duncan Smith and Bernard Jenkin (Forster 2002: 109). The 
conflict over Maastricht consolidated a shift to the right by the Conservative 
party (Berrington and Hague 1998: 54) that was centred around a populist 
reassertion of a right wing belief in British exceptionalism against which 
European integration was symbolically constituted as the 'other'.   
 
A key feature of the right wing Eurosceptic discourse during the Maastricht 
debate was that they presented themselves as the representatives of the people 
and the guardians of popular sovereignty. The argument was that the people of 
Europe, and in particular the British people, did not want the kind of Europe 
that had been envisaged at Maastricht. The freedom of the people was posited 
against a centralising European state. As the former Home Secretary, Kenneth 
Baker stated: 
 
The Danish and French referenda have shown vividly in the past six 
months that there is a movement across Europe which is not anti-
Europe but anti-bureaucratic and against a centralised and bossy 
Europe. That is what I believe the no-votes in France and Denmark 
were saying and what many people in Britain feel. (Hansard  212/56 24 
September 1992) 
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Although, the Eurosceptics aligned themselves with the people of Europe, they 
articulated a conception of popular sovereignty that was rooted in a Thatcherite 
populism of the strong state and the free market. John Butcher claimed that, 
'our people have always been in favour of a Europe-wide free trading area. 
They have never been in favour of the gradual and surrepticious building of a 
European state'  (Hansard 208/838. 3 June 1992). 
 
While this discourse had much in common with the Major government's claim 
that Maastricht was in line with the British conception of Europe, a distinctive 
feature of the Eurosceptic position was that the governing elites could no 
longer be trusted on Europe and had led the British people into a European 
state against their will. In the early Committee stages of the Maastricht bill, 
Cash made the point that Heath when Prime Minister had misled parliament 
and the people in a government White Paper claiming that Britain would retain 
its essential sovereignty on membership. Cash went on to argue 'that it is the 
basis on which the process has tended to move, and I believe that the same 
thing is happening with the present treaty, too.  The British people are not 
being told the truth; they are not being told exactly was is involved' (Hansard 
215/214 December 1992). Cash proved a tenacious opponent of the 
government. He tabled 240 amendments to the bill and voted 47 times against 
the government when a three-line whip was in place (Young 1998: 395).   
Crucially, he set out to prove that the treaty was not the decentralising 
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document that the government claimed. He claimed that 'the bottom line is that 
the treaty creates a legally binding union within Europe, which is quite 
different from the treaties that are normally transacted among countries' 
(Hansard  215/205 1 December 1992).  
 
The fear that Britain was being incorporated into what was for all intents and 
purposes a European state was compounded by the in balance of power within 
the European Union. In particular, Cash highlighted concerns over German 
domination arguing that 'we must contain Germany by a balance of power' 
(Hansard 215/222 1 December 1992). This echoed Thatcher's comments in 
May 1992 in which she had argued that Maastricht and its federal agenda 
augmented German power rather than contained it (Thatcher 1995: 491). A 
central theme of the Eurosceptic discourse was, therefore, the underlying 
instability of Europe. Evidently, the folly of the Maastricht Treaty was that it 
continued the European trend of centralising state building that had created the 
problems in Europe in the first place. European political modernisation was in 
essence flawed, fundamentally anti-British and potentially aggressive. With 
regards to the later, Cash warned the House of Commons of what he saw as 
some of the less explicit implications of the formation of a European Union: 
 
What is the most important function, or certainly one of the prime 
functions, of a legal entity of the kind that this European union is to be? 
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It is the call to arms. That is the direction in which this is going: to a 
common defence policy. What is the first requirement the first duty to 
be imposed on citizens? It is that they may be conscripted. (Hansard  
215/227 1 December 1992) 
 
From this discussion, it was evident that key aspects of the Eurosceptic 
discourse were centred around a call for the re-assertion of a distinctive 
sovereign, independent British state and a free market economy. The second 
wave of European integration was presented as the antithesis of this project. 
The parliamentary debate over Maastricht reflected the continued political 
currency of the arguments made by Thatcher in her Bruges speech. In its 
claims to represent and defend the will of the people, this discourse was 
fundamentally populist employing simple messages and emotive language.  In 
this respect, it effectively exposed the problems of legitimacy and democratic 
accountability that were undoubtedly features of the supranational elitism that 
was driving the second wave of integration. In particular, the Major 
government's position was shown to be inherently contradictory and in many 
respects misleading.  
 
Euroscepticism was a powerful defence of a strong and exceptional British 
state that was aligned with global capital interests, represented by the likes of 
Murdoch and Goldsmith. This was what Thatcherism had claimed to be at the 
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core of British national identities and interests and was fundamentally 
threatened by European forms of political modernisation. While it appeared to 
recognise and fear a revived nationalism emerging from the process of 
European integration, it also seemed to welcome and incite these developments 
as evidence of the rightness of its nationalist cause.  The general implication 
was that a range of fundamental threats to people's daily lives would only be 
avoided by maintaining and defending the 'exceptionalness' of Britain from the 
continent. While the exact influence of Euroscepticism on public opinion is 
open to debate, by the mid-1990s it was noticeable that public attitudes towards 
membership of the European Union had moved in a more negative and 
sceptical direction (Northcott 1995: 330; Hix 2002: 54-55). 
 
The impact of right wing Euroscepticism on British politics 
 
The crisis over Maastricht ratification traumatised the British political system. 
Alongside ERM withdrawal, it destroyed the credibility of Major government 
and opened up what have proved to be irreconcilable divisions within the 
Conservative party. It cannot be characterised as an attack by a marginalised 
faction within the Conservative party as it was an extensive populist movement 
supported by many at the centre of British political power.  It is a central claim 
of this paper that the presence of right wing Eurosceptic populism has 
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successfully structured the mainstream British political debate on Europe and 
directly impacted on how European policy is framed. 
 
The immediate consequence of the Maastricht rebellion and the extensive 
nature of Eurosceptic mobilisation that followed from it, was to further push 
the Major government in a more explicitly aggressive Thatcherite direction and 
further undermine any constructive engagement with European developments. 
On a number of issues, most notably over Qualified Majority Voting 
arrangements after enlargement and on the non-cooperation policy during the 
beef crisis, the British government were isolated and obstructive. The 
government increasingly turned issues of Community business into totemic 
struggles over the preservation of national independence and identity. The hold 
of a rigid and exclusive European discourse over the Conservative party left the 
Major government little room for constructive statecraft within the European 
Union.  The Maastricht crisis, therefore, helped to embed an approach to the 
EU that made significant concessions to right wing Euroscepticism. While it 
was characterised as outside the mainstream, governing elites did not 
fundamentally challenge the populist ideology of British exceptionalism that 
underpinned its arguments. Indeed, the discourse of the Major government 
shifted on to how European integration was now moving in a British direction 
(Young 1998: 451).   
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Major's shift to a harder form of Euroscepticism failed to heal the divisions 
within the Conservative party as a virulent Euroscepticism had taken hold 
across key sections of the party and, crucially, amongst grassroots supporters. 
The consequence of this was to ensure that Eurosceptics came to dominate the 
leadership of the party. The leaderships of William Hague and Ian Duncan 
Smith, a prominent backbench Maastricht rebel, ensured the Conservative 
party moved further in a Eurosceptic direction. This process towards principled 
opposition to any further British involvement in integration has been 
consolidated by Michael Howard, one of the main Eurosceptics in the Major 
cabinet during the Maastricht crisis. Nevertheless such developments on the 
mainstream right have not halted the rise to prominence of the UK 
Independence Party, a populist party that defines itself by opposition to the 
European Union, and successfully secured 12 MEPs in the 2004 European 
Parliament elections. Ironically, its policy of complete withdrawal from the EU 
has allowed a Conservative party to present itself as the middle way on Europe, 
despite campaigning for a fundamental reversal of the acquis communautaire 
and the return of powers to the nation-state.   
 
 The hardening of Euroscepticism on the right of British politics could be seen 
as part of the opposition to a Labour government that first came to power in 
1997 with an explicitly pro-European policy agenda. Originally, this policy 
was part of a project to turn Britain into a modern European social democracy 
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and was central to the modernisation of the party during the 1990s. However, 
Labour in power has been increasingly defensive on European integration, 
particularly evident in the delay in calling a referendum on the single currency 
and its defensive u-turn on a referendum over the European constitution. They 
have appeared reluctant to ignite and confront a populist Euroscepticism.   
 
There is evidence that the Labour government has been moving towards a more 
Eurosceptic position. Britain's relationship to the European Union is 
increasingly articulated in terms of 'red lines', opt outs and negative negotiating 
positions pursued in defence of the national interest. Gordon Brown has been 
notable in his willingness to adopt the language of Euroscepticism. 'Europe' is 
characterised by Brown as having  'old flawed assumptions' about inexorable 
moves towards federalism (2003b). The advantages of this strategy for New 
Labour are clear. It de-radicalises the impact of European integration on the 
structure of British politics by implying that it can be made consistent with the 
particularities of British political and economic development. A populist 
discourse of an Anglo-Europe is presented as the solution to Britain's European 
dilemma. Behind this is the powerful figure of the British Chancellor: 
 
British values have much to offer, persuading a global Europe that the 
only way forward is inter-governmental, not federal; mutual recognition 
not one-size-fits-all central rules; tax competition, not tax 
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harmonisation, with proper political accountability and subsidiarity, not 
a superstate. (Brown  2003a) 
 
Brown has adopted the Eurosceptic language and set out a principled 
opposition to further integration based on British 'values'. The implication is 
that pragmatic and nationalist arguments will form the basis of government 
attempts to legitimate the continuation of Britain's European trajectory.  
 
European integration and Britain 
 
The purpose of this paper has been to explain the presence of Euroscepticism at 
the centre of British politics as a manifestation of post-imperial populism in the 
British political system. However, the use of the European issue in this way 
also reflects the changeability and malleability of the integration process itself 
(Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004: 23). The openness surrounding integration and 
the degree of power that member-states continue to hold on to both in terms of 
the direction of integration and their role within it ensures that new treaties, and 
policies have the potential to become live national political issues. The very 
success of Eurosceptic forces during the Maastricht crisis in Britain was 
indicative of the contingencies surrounding integration. Eurosceptics were able 
to exploit these contingencies by for example persistently drawing attention to 
underlying legitimation problems across the European Union. Despite the 
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achievements of monetary union and enlargement, the direction of integration 
remains uncertain and legitimation problems persist both in Western Europe 
and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.  In particular, the presence of 
Euroscepticism in mainstream parties in the new accession countries has 
clearly altered the context in which the dominant British parties now operate. 
The Labour government has made considerable efforts in wooing new allies 
and building coalitions, both East and West, in support of an Anglo-European 
project that could place a principled opposition to any deeper integration 
process at the heart of the European Union
2
. The extreme UKIP version of hard 
Euroscepticism may in fact be limited by the capacity of New Labour to retain 
its own populist credentials and adapt the European issue to both British public 
opinion and contemporary European developments. However what is no longer 
credible, if it ever was, is the idea that the British Labour party is a principled 
pro-integration European social democratic party.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Britain is exceptional because of the extent to which Euroscepticism has 
entered into and influenced the mainstream political debate. The purpose of 
this paper has been to explain this development in terms of the inter-
relationship between the structure of post-imperial British politics and the 
practices of Eurosceptic forces.   
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A key proposition of this paper was that a post-imperial British crisis shifted 
the political system towards populist forms of legitimation. A context of 
uncertainty and change surrounding the meaning and trajectory of the British 
nation and state has given rise to a form of politics that transcends and 
transforms the party system. From the 1970s, 'Europe' became a feature of a 
populist form of politics alongside issues such as crime and immigration.  The 
political currency of Euroscepticism is therefore explained in terms of the 
structural susceptibility of the British post-imperial order to the politics of 
populism. This structural susceptibility is however only fully evident once we 
consider the processes by which Eurosceptic forces enter the mainstream of 
British politics. Firstly, Eurosceptic forces have explicitly targeted governing 
elites and sections of the established political class. They have tapped into a 
general disillusionment with mainstream elites and parties and claim to directly 
represent the  'real' interests of the 'people'. Secondly, in pursuing their cause, 
Eurosceptics have mobilised as a populist, albeit fragmented, national 
movement. In so doing they have often placed themselves outside of the 
traditional party system and above its ideological and partisan divisions in the 
pursuit of a far more 'fundamental' cause.  Finally, they have constructed a 
nationalist discourse that constitutes 'Europe' as the 'other' of British interests 
and identities. This is a discourse of fundamental and principled opposition to 
the integration project. In the case of right-wing Euroscepticism discussed in 
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relation to Maastricht, this represented a powerful and populist reworking of 
English Conservative ideology.  
 
The combination of structural susceptibility of the British political system to 
populism combined with the powerful and influential practices of a Eurosceptic 
movement has placed comparatively hard forms of Euroscepticism in the 
mainstream of British politics. The Conservative party is currently opposed to 
any further integration and puts forward a European policy centred on a 
revision of the main European treaties. The Labour government has proved 
reluctant to defend Britain's European trajectory and, at times, displays 
hostility to further integration. Its European policy is couched in nationalist and 
globalist terms. The British European debate therefore becomes dominated by 
conflicting variants of Euroscepticism and, in a reversal to what happens in 
many other major European countries, it is Europeanism that is marganilised. 
This creates chronic problems in achieving stable British political leadership on 
European issues. It implies that accommodating Britain to an emerging system 
of European multi-level governance is crisis ridden and that British 
governments' remain an unpredictable force inside the European Union.   
 
1
 As Szczerbiak and Taggart (2003) acknowledge, these are working definitions that are not 
without problems.  Evidently, more complex typologies suggest that the hard/soft distinction is 
more of a continuum than a dichotomy (see ibid: 10). 
2
 An opportunity to pursue this agenda was opened up with the defeat of the European 
constitution in referenda in France and the Netherlands at a point when the British were about 
to take up the presidency of the EU. 
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